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Abstract
The article considers the issues of Romania's membership in the EU. 
The author compares the EU's "Eastern" enlargement of 2004 with previous en-
largements. As it  turns out, the EU becomes poorer with every next enlarge-
ment: its per capita GDP decreases every time compared with per capita GDP of 
the six constitutor countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, and 
Netherlands). 
There are also sufficient economic arguments for postponement of Ro-
mania's  accession  in  2007  (or  2008).  Romania  does  not  exhibit  the  same 
macroeconomic stability the other countries of south-eastern Europe do; its wel-
fare is lower, and its progress in building market economy is slower compared to 
the  countries  that  joined  the  EU in  2004.  Moreover,  Romania  achieved little 
progress in fighting corruption. 
Finally, the author discusses the consequences of the rejection of the EU 
constitution by the French and the Dutch in 2005. In view of the ratification prob-
lems,  five  options are  suggested as possible  solutions  to  the problems.  The 
most probable is that the EU will proceed on the basis of the Nice treaty and po-
litical agreements. Further enlargement of the EU will be much more difficult to 
realize than in the past. This does not apply to Bulgaria and Romania, since the 
accession treaties were already signed in 2005, and they will join the EU in 2007 
or 2008. However, this does apply to Croatia and Turkey, with whom the EU 
opened accession negotiations in October 2005. 
 © Peter van der Hoek, 2006.
van der Hoek Peter,  Doctor of Economics, Professor, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, the Nether-
lands. 
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1. Introduction
The European Union’s response to the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) and 
the collapse of  the Soviet  Union (1991)  was quite  alert.  The Phare program 
(Poland Hungary: Assistance for Reconstruction of the Economy), offering finan-
cial support to Central Europe and Eastern European countries, was set up as 
early as in 1989. In addition, the European Union signed the first Europe Agree-
ments (with Poland and Hungary) in December 1991. These agreements offered 
trade  concessions  and other  benefits  normally  associated with  full  European 
Union membership (Schoors and Gobbin, 2005). More Europe Agreements fol-
lowed suit. The European Union also concluded agreements with Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic,  Romania and Slovakia (1993); Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
(1995);  and Slovenia  (1996).  Eventually,  this  process resulted at  the Copen-
hagen European Council of December 2002 in an unprecedented enlargement 
of the European Union by proposing membership for ten applicant countries by 
May 1, 2004. The applications of Bulgaria and Romania were put on hold, but 
the Copenhagen Council clearly communicated the intention to welcome them 
as members in 2007. 
Table 1 shows the relative importance of the accession countries at the time 
of their applications in the mid-1990s. Their combined population amounted to 
28% of that of the EU-15. Their combined GDP amounted to only 4% of that of the 
EU-15 at current prices or 9% at purchasing power standards. GDP per capita in 
the applicant countries amounted to 13% at current prices or 32% at purchasing 
power standards. Thus, the applicant countries are poor relative to the EU-15 and, 
despite their sizeable population, their economic weight is very small.
Table  2  compares  the  2004  enlargement  with  three  previous  enlarge-
ments:
1. The 1973 enlargement, when Denmark, Ireland, and the UK joined the 
EU-6.
2. The enlargement in the 1980s (Greece in 1981 and Portugal and Spain 
in 1986).
3. The 1995 enlargement, when Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the 
EU-12.
Table 1. 
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The 10 Applicant Countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
as a Percentage of the EU, 1995
Area Popula-tion
Total GDP 
(current 
prices)
GDP per 
capita (cur-
rent prices)
Total GDP 
(purchasing 
power)
GDP per capi-
ta (purchasing 
power)
33 28 4 13 9 32
Source: European Commission, Agenda 2000 – Volume II – Communication: The effects 
on the Union’s policies of enlargement to the applicant countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe (Impact study), p. 68.
Table 2. 
Impact of Successive Enlargements of the EU (Based on 1995 Data)
Increase 
in Area
Increase 
in Popu-
lation
Increase 
in Total 
GDP
Change 
in per 
capita 
GDP
Average per 
capita GDP 
(EU-6 = 100)
EU-9/EU-6 31% 32% 29% –3% 97
EU-12/EU-9 48% 22% 15% –6% 91
EU-15/EU-12 43% 11% 8% –3% 89
EU-26/EU-15 34% 29% 9% –16% 75
Source: European Commission, Agenda 2000 – Volume II – Communication: The effects 
on the Union’s policies of enlargement to the applicant countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe (Impact study), p. 24.
Table 2 does not include Cyprus, but it does include Bulgaria and Roma-
nia. The exclusion of Cyprus hardly makes a difference compared to the ten ap-
plicant countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE-10) given Cyprus’ small 
size. In terms of area the Eastern enlargement is similar in size to the first en-
largement in 1973, but smaller than the enlargements in the 1980s and in 1995. 
In terms of population the Eastern enlargement will  be similar to the enlarge-
ments in 1973 and the 1980s, but considerably larger than the enlargement of 
1995. Total GDP increased somewhat less than the population both in 1973 and 
in 1995, but after the Southern enlargement of the 1980s the increase of GDP 
was much smaller than the population increase. In fact, the result of each en-
largement has been a decrease of GDP per capita. Thus, the EU became poorer 
by every enlargement and after the Eastern enlargement GDP per capita in the 
EU will be as low as 75% of that of the original six members. The 2004 enlarge-
ment was unprecedented in terms of the number of accession countries, their di-
versity and their welfare levels.
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2. Romania: A Comparative Perspective
In order to assess whether or not the EU was right when it delayed Roma-
nia’s accession to 2007 or 2008 I will compare the economic developments in 
Romania with the average performance of Romania’s own region – South East-
ern  Europe1 (SEE)  and  that  of  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  plus  the  Baltic 
States2 (SEE + BS). To this end I present a number of Figures providing some 
insight in the economic performance of SEE, CEE + BS and Romania. Figure 1 
shows that  CEE + BS already experienced continuously positive growth rates 
from 1993, whereas SEE including Romania had to wait until 2000, though it ex-
perienced positive growth rates in the mid-1990s. From the late 1990s growth 
rates tend to converge, when they turn positive throughout the region. 
Figure 1. 
Real GDP Growth (in %), 1990–2005
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Source: EBRD.
1 Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro, FYR Macedonia and Ro-
mania.
2 Croatia,  Czech  Republic,  Hungary,  Poland,  Slovakia,  Slovenia  (CEE)  and  Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania (BS).
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Figure 2 shows the results of the development in the period 1990–2002 in 
terms of GDP level in 2002 relative to that in 1989. The slowest development oc-
curred in Moldova and Ukraine, but SEE (including Bulgaria and Romania) also 
still lags behind the level of GDP at the end of the communist era. In fact, Roma-
nia is the only accession country with negative growth in the period 1997–2001 
(–1.0%)3. CEE + BS, however, are now well above their 1989 level. 
Figure 2. 
GDP Level in 2004 (1989 = 100)
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Source: EBRD.
Another way of looking at GDP-levels is by relating GDP per capita to the 
EU-average (see Figure 3). Slovenia was the richest of the CEE candidate coun-
tries with a GDP per capita of 69% of the EU-average, which is almost as high 
as that of Spain and higher than that of the poorest EU member state, Greece. 
Romania had the lowest GDP per capita similar to that of Turkey. As we saw 
above, in economic terms the Eastern enlargement is considerably smaller than 
the first (1973) enlargement, even though the increase in population is relatively 
in the same order of magnitude.
3 The second lowest growth rate was that of the Czech Republic (1.1%). 
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Figure 3. 
GDP per Capita in Purchasing Power Standards 
as % of the EU Average, 1995 and 2002
24
55
23
37
18
24
31
23
41
59
66
25
62
40
53
39 39 41
25
47
69 67
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
B
ul
ga
ria
C
ze
ch
R
ep
ub
lic
Es
to
ni
a
H
un
ga
ry
La
tv
ia
Li
th
ua
ni
a
Po
la
nd
R
om
an
ia
Sl
ov
ak
ia
Sl
ov
en
ia
G
re
ec
e
1995 2002
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A measure for a country’s attractiveness to foreign investors is the inflow 
of Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). The absolute amount of FDI is not very sig-
nificant, as this will largely depend on the population size. Figure 4 shows, there-
fore, the cumulative FDI-inflow per capita in the period 1989–2003. Obviously, 
Romania’s attractiveness to foreign investors has been limited, which is quite 
representative for the region. Although Romania has done considerably better 
than the former Soviet republics in the region and a little bit better the region on 
average, it has performed considerably worse than CEE + BS.
The share of the private sector in GDP is a key indicator for the reforms 
needed for the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy. Figure 5 
illustrates to which degree the countries considered have made progress in their 
efforts to establish a market economy. I have included three years: 1993 (the 
first year data is available), 1994 (the year in which the first official applications 
for EU membership were filed), and 2001 (the most recent year for which data 
are available). One may wonder, however, how significant these data are. First, 
one may doubt how accurate it is. For example, was Romania’s private sector 
share really 35% in 1993? Second, the data does not indicate what I call the 
quality of the privatization process. The strong increase in Ukraine’s private sec-
tor share in 1994, for example, may in fact indicate a Russian type of privatiza-
tion, i. e., a very small group of oligarchs capture state assets for next to nothing. 
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The term robbery of the state seems a more appropriate term for this process 
than privatization. Currently, a kind of counter robbery by the state emerges in 
Russia, witness what happened to Yukos (that the Russian government led to 
bankruptcy in 2004 by means of  tax assessments) and its president Michael 
Khodorkovsky (who was sentenced to nine years in prison on May 31, 2005, 
while he was also ordered to pay more than 17 billion rubles or $615 million in 
taxes and penalties). As a result, Khodorkovsky cannot run for president in 2008 
and 2012.
Figure 6 displays developments regarding general government balances, 
an issue that has received relatively little attention. It shows that there is also 
good news about Romania as it has done quite well with regard to its general 
government balance and has met the EMU-requirement of 3%. In this respect, 
Romania has performed better than SEE as a whole. 
Figure 4.
Cumulative FDI-Inflows per Capita in US$, 1989–2003
775
2089
210
486
122
1923
450
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
Bulgaria Hungary Moldova Romania Ukraine CEE+BS SEE
Source: EBRD.
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Figure 5.
Private Sector Share in GDP
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Figure 6. 
General Government Balances (in % of GDP)
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Finally, I will pay attention to a non-economic dimension that nonetheless 
affects the economic performance: the extent of corruption. Table 3 shows the 
amount of perceived corruption over time in the EU member states and Bulgaria 
and Romania. The scores range between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt) 
and relate to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people 
and risk analysts. Respondents expressed their perceptions in surveys assess-
ing a country’s performance. At least 3 surveys are required for a country to be 
included. Therefore, Transparency International could only include 159 countries 
– that is approximately three quarters of the more than 200 sovereign nations – 
in its 2005 Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The 27 countries listed in Table 3 
are ranked on the basis of their score in the CPI 2005, while their CPI 2005 
ranking is included between parentheses.
Table 3. 
Corruption Perception Index, 1995–2005
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
1. (2) Finland 9.1 9.1 9.5 9.6 9.8 10.0 9.9 9.7 9.7 9.7 9.6
2. (4) Denmark 9.3 9.3 9.9 10.0 10.0 9.8 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5
3. (6) Sweden 8.9 9.1 9.4 9.5 9.4 9.4 9.0 9.3 9.3 9.2 9.2
4. (10) Austria 7.1 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.8 8.0 8.8 8.7
5. (11) Netherlands 8.7 8.7 9.0 9.0 9.0 8.9 8.8 9.0 8.9 8.7 8.6
6. (11) UK 8.6 8.4 8.2 8.7 8.6 8.7 8.3 8.7 8.7 8.6 8.6
7. (13) Luxembourg – – 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.6 8.7 9.0 8.7 8.4 8.5
8. (16) Germany 8.1 8.3 8.2 7.9 8.0 7.6 7.4 7.3 7.7 8.2 8.2
9. (18) France 7.0 7.0 6.7 6.7 6.6 6.7 6.7 6.3 6.9 7.1 7.5
10. (19) Belgium 6.9 6.8 5.3 5.4 5.3 6.1 6.6 7.1 7.6 7.5 7.4
11. (19) Ireland 8.6 8.5 8.3 8.2 7.7 7.2 7.5 6.9 7.5 7.5 7.4
12. (23) Spain 4,4 4,3 5,9 6.1 6.6 7.0 7.0 7.1 6.9 7.1 7.0
13. (25) Malta – – – – – – – – – 6.8 6.6
14. (26 Portugal 5.6 6.5 7.0 6.5 6.7 6.4 6.3 6.3 6.6 6.3 6.5
15. (27) Estonia – – – 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.6 5.6 5.5 6.0 6.4
16. (31) Slovenia – – – – 6.0 5.5 5.2 6.0 5.9 6.0 6.1
17. (37) Cyprus – – – – – – – – 6.1 5.4 5.7
18. (40) Hungary 4.1 4.9 5.2 5.0 5.2 5.2 5.3 4.9 4.8 4.8 5.0
19. (40) Italy 3.4 3.4 5.0 4.6 4.7 4.6 5.5 5.2 5.3 4.8 4.8
20. (44) Lithuania – – – – 3.8 4.1 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.6 5.0
21. (47) Czech Rep. – 5.4 5.2 4.8 4.6 4.3 3.9 3.7 3.9 4.2 4.3
22. (47) Greece 4.0 5.0 5.4 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.3
23. (47) Slovak Rep. – – – 3.9 3.7 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.7 4.0 4.3
24. (51) Latvia – – – 2.7 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.7 3.8 4.0 4.2
25. (55) Bulgaria – – – 2.9 3.3 3.5 3.9 4.0 3.9 4.1 4.0
26. (70) Poland – 5.6 5.1 4.6 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.0 3.6 3.5 3.4
27. (85) Romania – – 3.4 3.0 3.3 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.8 2.9 3.0
Source: Transparency International.
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Northwestern Europe is doing relatively well with scores of over 8.0. Italy 
and Greece were the most corrupt nations in the EU-15 and after the 2004 en-
largement they still belong to the most corrupt EU member states. Only three EU 
member  countries  (Slovakia,  Latvia  and  Poland)  are  perceived  more  corrupt 
than Greece. Obviously, Romania is at the bottom of the list with a score of 3.0 
indicating that doing business in Romania is subject to additional risks resulting 
from corruption causing additional uncertainties. Particularly worrying is that the 
corruption is not diminishing over time, but is actually worse now than it was in 
the late 1990s. The Copenhagen council decided in December 2002 that Bulgar-
ia and Romania had to wait for EU membership until 2007, while the accession 
year could be further postponed to 2008 if  these countries had made to little 
progress. Initially, the European Commission would publish its proposal on Ro-
mania’s (and Bulgaria’s) accession year in May 2006. However, in its May 2006 
mo motoring report on Romania the Commission announced to postpone its pro-
posal to October 2006. The Commission leaves no doubt about whether the ac-
cession date of January 1, 2007, can be maintained primarily depends on Ro-
mania’s ability to demonstrate further results in the fight against corruption by 
October 2006 (European Commission, 2006b).
The data presented here make clear that there were good economic rea-
sons for  the postponement  of  Romania’s  accession  until  2007 (or  2008),  al-
though these were not the only reasons. Romania did not achieve macro-eco-
nomic stability as fast as the other countries in the region, neither in terms of 
prices nor in terms of economic growth. Its welfare level is lower and its progress 
in  establishing  a  market  economy  is  slower  compared  to  the  countries  that 
joined  the  EU in  2004.  In  addition,  it  has realized little  progress in  the  fight 
against corruption.
3. Prospects
The Nice Treaty (February 2001) called for "a deeper and wider debate 
about the future of the European Union". The Laeken European Council (De-
cember 2001) followed up by adopting a "Declaration on the future of the Euro-
pean Union" that explicitly referred to World Wars I and II that weakened Eu-
rope’s position in the world. This brought a growing realization that «“only peace 
and concerted action could make the dream of a strong, unified Europe come 
true»”. The declaration committed the EU to greater democracy, transparency 
and efficiency, and to preparing a constitution for European citizens. The latter 
was done by the European Convention on the Future of Europe, which present-
ed a draft constitutional treaty to the European Council June 20, 2003. 
On June 18, 2004, the European Council adopted unanimously the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe beginning with the words «Reflecting the 
will of the citizens…». The 25 member states signed it in Rome on October 29, 
2004 after which the member states had to ratify it. Ten countries had already 
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ratified it before the French voters rejected the constitution on May 29, 2005. 
The Dutch voters also rejected it on June 1, 2005, but one day later the Latvian 
parliament approved the constitution (on June 2, 2005). As of February 9, 2006, 
14 member states had approved the Constitutional Treaty, two had rejected it 
and 14 member countries had not yet decided (European Commission, 2006a).
From the legal perspective it is very difficult to proceed with the EU after 
the «No» vote by two founding EU member states, but politically it is not possi-
ble to stop.  Although it  has proved very difficult  for the European Council  to 
reach a compromise on the financial  perspectives 2007-2013,  this  is nothing 
new.  Negotiations  on  the  European  budget  have  always  been  very  difficult. 
Thus, this cannot be considered a sign that the EU is unable to make decisions 
about the future. Undoubtedly, it will continue to function even though the French 
and Dutch voters rejected the draft constitutional treaty in May/June 2005.
When the constitution was signed, it was agreed that that if some 
members would have problems with ratification, the European Council will de-
cide what  to do next.  Now there are ratification problems in France and the 
Netherlands it seems that there is a number of options including:
1. A re-run of referendums that resulted in a No (as proposed by EU-pres-
ident Juncker). However, this seems something of the past, not of the present. 
2. The countries that rejected the constitution leave the EU. The current 
treaties do not provide for secession. The constitution does, but is dead.
3. Apply the constitution to those countries that accepted it: a EU of two 
blocks. This requires adjustments of the constitutional treaty. Therefore, it should 
be subject to a new ratification procedure.
4. Draft an abbreviated version (as the Finnish MP Kiljunen has proposed) 
and hold a EU-wide referendum (proposed by the Austrian chancellor Schüssel). 
But would that be approved? 
5. Proceed on the basis of the Nice Treaty and political agreements: a di-
verse union rather than an ever-closer union.
In the long run, unity might still emerge. In the short run, however, the EU 
will most likely evolve as it has been evolving over the past: multi-tiered as the 
following three examples illustrate:
• Not all EU countries participate in the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU). The Denmark, Sweden and the UK have refused to join EMU 
and still have their national currencies. Interestingly, the new member 
states that joined the EU in 2004 do not have a choice. As soon as 
they meet the EMU criteria they must join EMU.
• Some EU countries have opted out from certain policy areas. The UK, 
for example, has opted out of the Social Charter, while Denmark, Ire-
land, and the UK have opted out of provisions related to asylum, im-
migration, and visas.
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• The Schengen treaty shows that cooperation between a majority of 
EU member states with outsiders (Iceland, Norway and – after the 
Swiss voters’ approval in June and September 2005 – Switzerland).
The most important  consequence for the future seems that  further  en-
largement of the EU will be much more difficult to realize than in the past. This 
does not apply to Bulgaria and Romania as the accession treaties were already 
signed in April  2005. As a result,  these countries will  join the EU in 2007 or 
2008. It does apply, however, to Croatia and Turkey with whom the EU opened 
accession negotiations in October 2005. In addition, it applies to the Former Yu-
goslav Republic of Macedonia with whom accession negotiations started have 
not yet begun.
Bibliography
1. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (several years) Transi-
tion report, London: EBRD.
2. European  Commission  (2006a)  «A  Constitution  for  Europe  –  Interactive 
Map» [http://europa.eu.int/constitution/ratification_en.htm].
3. European Commission (2006b) «Monitoring report on the state of prepared-
ness for EU membership of Bulgaria and Romania», COM (2006) 214.
4. Schoors, K. and N. Gobbin (2005) «Enlargement», in M. Peter van der Hoek 
(ed.) Handbook of Public Administration and Policy in the European Union, 
Boca Raton: CRC Press/Taylor & Francis, pp. 603–646.
5. Transparency  International  (several  years)  Corruption  Perceptions  Index, 
[http://www.transparency.org/surveys/index.html].
The article was received on May 30, 2006.
33
